Is bank financing compatible with innovation? We provide evidence that banks -particularly those experienced in lending to innovative firms -recognize the value of a firm's intellectual property, as concretized by patent stock, and provide cheaper loans ex-ante.
Introduction
The role of innovation as a critical driver of economic growth has been well established by the work of Solow (1957) and others. For the most part, there is consensus in the literature that a welldeveloped financial sector and strong investor protections (see e.g., Levine and Zervos 1998) are conducive to innovation and economic growth. There is, however, less agreement on whether certain types of institutions and financing arrangements are more compatible with innovative activities. A commonly expressed view is that equity financing could be more consistent with innovative activity, while debt -particularly bank debt -might be unsuitable. Rajan and Zingales (2003) , for instance, argue that equity and public debt are more conducive to innovative activity, while bank financing might be better suited to funding more routine projects. 1 However, financing innovative activity with public securities may have downsides as well: Public securities could, for instance, pressure management to focus on short-term routine projects at the expense of longer-term novel projects (Holmstrom, 1989) .
In this paper, we investigate whether bank financing is suitable for innovative firms by analyzing the functioning of the loan market for these firms. The issue is a salient one since bank financing remains an important source of capital for both innovative and non-innovative firms. 2 We examine whether banks -particularly those with experience in lending to innovative firms -price their loans to reflect the value of the firm's patents. Also, ex post, in the event of covenant violation (see Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009, 2012) , we examine whether experienced lenders are discerning in terms of the changes they seek in firm policy. Given the relative scale of corporate R&D and the substantial contribution of intellectual property (IP) to the value of many public firms and to the economy as a whole, understanding the efficacy of bank financing of innovative firms is critical.
With patent protection, intellectual property acquires a measure of asset tangibility, which facilitates the provision of bank financing. It is usually argued that innovative firms suffer a significant reduction in the value of their IP in the event of financial distress, i.e., low recovery rates -inducing innovative firms to normally choose modest leverage (see e.g., Titman and Wessels, 1988) . However, this may be less of a concern when a firm's IP is substantially patent protected, because patents can potentially be sold off in the event of default. Patent sales are not uncommon and the transfer of ownership rights to patents and licenses occurs regularly, for instance, in bankruptcy proceedings. 3 An interesting development in the evolution of the intellectual property rights is the recent attempt to establish an online market for patents. While success is uncertain, a patent market could enhance the value and liquidity of patents. 4 For our empirical analysis we rely on a large sample of bank loans to public firms and show that lenders tend to value the innovative activity of public firms. We use the number of patents filed by firms as well as the cumulative number of citations to these patents as proxies for the level and tangibility of firm innovation. The cumulative number of citations to a patent has been used in the literature as a measure of patent quality (Griliches, 1990; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001) . We find that firms with significant patenting activity are charged lower loan spreads by lenders. For instance, firms with an above-median number of patents are associated with loan spreads that are 7.19% (or 14.4 basis points) lower than for the median firm. Lenders also appear to distinguish between patents that are more specialized, i.e., of interest to a narrow class of firms, and those that have value to a more general class of firms. A patent is deemed to be more general if it is cited by subsequent patents that belong to a wide range of technology classes (Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001; Nanda and Nicholas, 2012) . Among innovative firms, our finding is that it is firms with highly cited and more general patents that tend to be granted cheaper loans.
Without the ability for bank personnel or loan officers to evaluate borrower IP and patents, it is unlikely that banks could be effective providers of capital to innovative firms. We expect banks to differ in their skill level and our analysis suggests that banks with more experience in lending to innovative firms do appear to possess a stronger capability to assess IP value. In addition to their expertise, we might expect some banks to develop a reputation for being flexible and discerning in response to a credit event such as a covenant violation. Such a reputation would likely make the bank more attractive to innovative firms. Consistent with this intuition, our results suggest that lenders differ in their ability to value innovative activity and to resolve credit events. Lenders that have significant experience with innovative firms (based on the fraction of their total loans, in dollar terms, made to innovative firms over the sample period) tend to charge a lower loan spread to innovative firms. They also appear to be more successful in their response to covenant violations.
Our findings on the relation between loan spreads and patenting are, however, subject to potential endogeneity concerns. It is possible that, despite various firm and industry controls, the results are partly driven by unobserved firm attributes that correlate with (lower) firm risk and with patenting activity. To address these concerns, we exploit an exogenous change in laws that have strengthened patent protection and increased the protection period. A finding that patents had a stronger effect on spreads following the passage of the law would support the notion that the differences in loan spreads were related to the presence of valuable patents -and not just to some unobserved firm characteristics. Specifically, we exploit the exogenous change in patent value due to the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act (1994) . The agreement was to be accompanied by implementation of the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which increased international protection for patent rights, thereby increasing the value of patents.
Further, patents were to be granted for a term of 20 years from the date of filing (for patents filed on or after June 8th, 1995). This change had the effect of increasing the term of patents, which had been 17 years from grant date before the passage of the new law. Using a difference-in-differences approach around 1995, we find that firms with patents granted after 1995 experienced a significantly greater decrease in loan spread after 1996, compared with firms without patents. This finding allays endogeneity concerns and indicates that the relation between loan spread and patents is reflective of banks recognizing patent value.
After documenting the ex ante effects that lenders value innovative activity, we consider the ex post effects. Violations of financial covenants in bank loans contracts lead to technical defaults and a shift of control rights to the creditor, who can then use the threat of accelerating the loan to extract concessions and/or compel the borrowers to follow her preferred course of action. Consistent with existing literature (see Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009) , we find that borrowers that experience technical violations on loan covenants reduce capital expenditures significantly postviolation. However, the decrease in capital expenditures is more marked for non-patenting firms as compared to firms with patenting activity. This finding reinforces the earlier results that lenders value the innovative activity of firms and treat their investments somewhat differently than the investments of borrowers with little innovative activity.
Next, we analyze the change in R&D expenses around covenant violations. To our knowledge, we are the first to study lender intervention in firms' R&D policies after a technical covenant violation.
Again, in line with the findings in the literature (see Roberts, 2008, and Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2012) , firms that violate covenants decrease their R&D expenditures significantly. But, in contrast to the capital expenditure cuts, patenting firms cut their R&D more significantly postviolation than firms with no patenting activity. At some level, this makes sense if there is greater leeway for trimming inessential expenses from the substantially larger R&D expenses of patenting firms. Further, our results suggest that lenders with greater experience in lending to innovative firms require a greater reduction in borrower R&D expenses when the spending appears inefficient, such as when the firm has low innovative efficiency or significantly higher R&D expenses than the industry median. In general, therefore, the pattern appears to be that post-covenant violations, experienced lenders tend to push borrowers into cutting inefficient R&D, while maintaining capital investments. Do shareholders benefit from the actions of experienced lenders, despite the reduction in R&D expenditures? Following Nini et al. (2012) , we examine the violating firms' abnormal returns to understand whether shareholders perceive these cuts to R&D as value enhancing. We find that firms borrowing from experienced lenders in the prior five years exhibit significantly higher CARs than other patenting firms after covenant violation. For instance, firms with experienced lenders earn a 1% average abnormal return in the six months following violation. In contrast, firms with inexperienced lenders do not experience significant abnormal returns over the same window. This difference suggests that patenting firms benefit from the corrective actions on R&D and investment policy that are imposed by experienced lenders, leading to better performance after covenant violations.
We believe that some observations are in order. Our ex ante loan pricing results show that innovative firms receive cheaper loans, especially when they borrow from lenders with greater experience with innovative firms. Further, our ex post analysis shows that experienced lenders exercise control rights judiciously by cutting inefficient R&D and improve firms' performance, justifying their lending with lower spread ex ante. One concern with these results may be that innovative firms are less risky when compared with firms that do not innovate. Our specifications, based on the literature (for example, Chava, Livdan, and Purnanandam, 2009 ), already control for many variables that are related to the credit risk of the firm. While it is still possible that there is an omitted variable that is correlated with both loan spread and innovative activity that is driving our results, we believe this to be unlikely. First, the difference-in-differences estimation shows that the link between patents and loan spread is related to the value of patents, which increases after the exogenous change of patent term and protection. Second, there is heterogeneity in the innovative firms. If at all, the omitted variable would need to be correlated with credit risk only for those firms that have more highly cited and more general patents. Finally, our results show that only lenders with greater experience with innovative firms give cheaper loans to innovative firms and, ex post, are more aggressive in intervening in the firm's R&D expenditures.
Our paper contributes to various strands of the literature. The first is the financing of innovation. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that equity and public debt are more conducive to innovative activity, while bank financing may be better suited to funding more routine projects. However, public markets have their own problems in financing innovative activity. For instance, Holmstrom (1989) argues that public securities may also pressure management to focus on short-term routine projects at the expense of longer-term novel projects. Similarly, the results of Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) are consistent with the view that, because of capital market imperfections, the flow of internal finance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small, high-tech firms acquire technology through R&D. In light of this literature, our results suggest that, at least in some contexts, banks with experience in lending to innovative firms may well be adept at valuing the innovative activity of the firms and efficient at providing capital. Bank lending is an important source of funding for public firms and the fact that experienced banks value innovation means that even firms without deep pockets and whose innovative activity is being undervalued in the equity market, may be able to finance innovative activity. Second, our paper contributes to the bank loan pricing literature by showing that lenders, especially experienced lenders, consider the innovative activity of firms and the quality of innovation in their lending decisions, and grant cheaper loans to firms. In a recent paper, Francis et al. (2012) show that borrowers with a higher capability of innovation enjoy lower bank-loan spreads and better non-price-related loan terms. Our ex ante pricing results are consistent with Francis et al. (2012) , but in addition, we explore the role of lender expertise and the quality of patenting on ex ante loan pricing.
Third, to our knowledge, our paper is the first to document that lenders consider innovative ac-tivity of firms ex post in exercising their control rights after covenant violations. We contribute to the literature on the transfer of control rights after technical covenant violations (see Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini, Smith, and Sufi, 2009, 2012) by showing an additional channel, R&D, through which creditors intervene in borrowers' investment policies. Importantly, our results showcase that when innovative borrowers violate their covenants and control rights pass to lenders, the lenders appear to exercise control rights judiciously and differentiate between firms that are performing valuable innovative activity and those that are not. We show that there is heterogeneity among lenders in how they value the innovative activity of firms and that lenders with experience in lending to innovative firms respond differently to technical violations of their borrowers. Finally, and consistent with earlier results, we show that the stock market response is generally more positive following technical covenant violations by innovative firms when the bank is experienced.
Our paper is also related to the literature that examines the effects of laws, regulations, and governance on innovation. Acharya and Subramanian (2009) find that debtor-friendly bankruptcy laws foster innovation and economic growth, while Acharya, Baghai, and Subramanian (2012) provide evidence that laws that impose restrictions on dismissal of employees encourage innovation and entrepreneurship. Chemmanur and Tian (2013) find that firm-level anti-takeover provisions encourage innovation. Sapra, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2013) show that the degree of innovation varies in a U-shaped manner with the severity of external takeover pressure as measured by the stringency of state-level anti-takeover laws. Atanassov (2013) highlights the potential for agency problems, showing that the passage of anti-takeover laws shields management from external governance and leads to less innovation. In a somewhat different setting, Seru (2012) finds that firms that are more reliant on internal capital markets produce fewer and less novel patents because of agency problems between headquarters and divisional managers. Finally, Chava, Oettl, Subramanian, and Subramanian (2013) show that intrastate banking deregulation, which increased the local market power of banks, decreased the level and risk of innovation by young, private firms. In contrast, interstate banking deregulation, which decreased the local market power of banks, increased the level and risk of innovation by young, private firms. Their results suggest that the nature of financial sector deregulation crucially affects the potential benefits to the real economy.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the construction of our measures of firm innovation and lender experience along with the description of the bank loan data. Sections 3 and 4 presents the methodology and the main empirical results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Data and Construction of Variables
We begin by describing the main sources of data and the variable definitions, such as our measures of firm innovativeness, used for the study. The characteristics of the loans and of borrowers and lenders are summarized below as well.
Data Sources
We use four sources of data to construct our sample: (1) Loan Pricing Corporation's (LPC) Dealscan for the bank loan data, (2) COMPUSTAT data for firm level accounting information, (3) The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) patent database for the innovation measures, and (4) covenant violation data provided by Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) .
We use the dollar-denominated private loans to U.S. firms from the LPC DealScan database.
This database provides comprehensive information on private loan pricing and contract terms such as loan amount and maturity, loan purpose, and financial covenants, etc., from 1987 onwards. The information is collected from SEC filings and public documents, lenders, and a staff of reporters.
DealScan provides good coverage of loan contracts made to U.S. public firms. According to Carey and Hrycray (1999) , the database covers between 50% and 75% of the volume for all commercial and industrial loans in the U.S. The loan data is organized by deal (package) and loan (facility). A package is a contract that may contain multiple loan facilities. Because the loan pricing information is available at the facility level, we use facility as the unit of observation.
Firms' annual accounting information is drawn from COMPUSTAT. We match the loan sample to firm accounting data using Roberts' DealScan-COMPUSTAT Linking Database (See Chava and Roberts, 2008, for details) . We ensure that a borrower's accounting information is publicly available at the time of loan origination by matching every loan observation to the latest COMPUSTAT data with the fiscal period end that is at least three months before the loan start date.
We use patent data from the NBER patent database to construct our innovation measures. The NBER patent database provides information on patents granted from 1962 to 2006 and all the citations made to these patents over the same period. The NBER database also provides a match between patent assignees and public firms in the North American COMPUSTAT. This allows us to match firms' patenting activities to their accounting information and loan data. Our sample period is limited by the availability of patent data and covers loans initiated from 1987 to 2007. After excluding financial firms (SIC code 6000-6999), there are 27,425 loans and 5,669 borrowing firms in the loan pricing sample.
We use covenant violation data provided by Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012) 
Measures of Innovation
We measure firms' intangible assets based on the number of patents granted to the firm. We are able to match patents to firms using the assignee-COMPUSTAT identifier links provided by the NBER 
where Patents Granted t is the number of patents granted in year t. This measure accounts for all the patents a firm holds with a 20% annual depreciation rate. 6 We focus on two attributes of patents that are expected to be related to their potential collateral value. The first one is the citation count.
According to Trajtenberg (1990) , the number of citations is correlated with the quality of innovations.
The citation count corresponds to the value of the patent as collateral to the extent that it reflects the interest other firms may have in either licensing or acquiring the patent. We again follow Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) to measure Citations per Patent as follows:
where Citation Stock is measured as follows: 
All citations are non-self citations and have been adjusted for truncation bias. 7 Another attribute of patents is the generality of the patent. A patent is deemed to be more general if it is cited by subsequent patents that belong to a wide range of technology classes. There are 429 patent classes in the NBER patent data. As in Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001) , generality of a patent l is measured as follows:
where S lk denotes the fraction of citations for patent l that belongs to patent class k among n different
classes. The ratio
Citations l
Citations l −1 is used to adjust for potential bias when the number of citations is small. To measure Generality for a firm's patent stock, we first compute the average generality for all the patents granted in the same year. We then compute Generality as an average of generality over the past five years, weighted by the depreciated number of patents granted in each year.
Patents are considered an important indicator of innovative activity in both micro-and macroeconomic studies (Pakes and Griliches, 1980, and Griliches, 1990) . Admittedly, patents provide an imperfect measure of innovation. But there is no consensus on other measures that can capture technological advances and innovative activity of firms. R&D spending is an alternative proxy for innovation but it has significant drawbacks. First, accounting norms, particularly whether R&D is capitalized or expensed affects the reported R&D spending. Second, while R&D reflects the input to the innovation process, the number of patents measures the innovation output. Finally, we expect lenders to pay particular attention to a firm's patents and the quality given that patents have well-defined property rights.
Lenders' Experience in Lending to Innovative Firms
We also examine how a lender's experience with innovative firms affects its assessment of the value of patents. We regard a lender as experienced if a substantial portion of the lender's loans have been made to firms with patent portfolios. For our measure of lender experience, we consider all the loans in the sample for which the lender was lead lender and obtain the fraction of the loans (by amount) that went to patenting firms as follows:
Lender Experience h = Total loan amount to patenting firms Total loan amount over sample period .
We then rank lenders by this measure and define lenders as experienced if their rankings are above the sample median. We follow Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011) to identify lead lenders. First, we find lenders with a field labeled "Lead Arranger Credit" that takes the value of "Yes" in the database; we then find lenders with the following roles: agent, administrative agent, arranger, and lead bank. Note that there are cases where we identify multiple lead lenders. One concern about multiple lead lenders is that when there are too many "lead" lenders it is not clear which role each is taking in the process of loan origination and monitoring. To focus on lenders that are clearly taking significant roles in loan origination, we exclude loans with more than three lead lenders in the calculation and ranking of lenders' experience. 8
Firm and Loan Characteristics
We focus on the effect of firms' innovation on loan prices to examine whether lenders ex ante value firms' innovative activities. For this purpose, the dependent variable of interest is loan spread.
DealScan provides all-in-drawn spread of each loan facility that measures the amount a borrower pays in basis points over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down, including an annual fee. Following Chava et al. (2008) and Drucker and Puri (2005) , we use the natural logarithm of all-in-drawn spread as the dependent variable in our regressions.
Following Chava et al. (2008) , we also control for a set of firm characteristics that are likely to affect loan pricing. Firms with a different size, capital structure, profitability, and default risk are likely to face a different cost of debt. We therefore control for these factors in the loan pricing regressions. Log Assets is measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. EBITDA/Assets, a measure of profitability, equals to EBITDA divided by total assets. Leverage is the sum of longterm debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets. Z Score, a measure of default risk, is defined as a weighted sum of EBIT/Assets, Sale/Assets, Retained Earnings/Assets, Working
Capital/Assets, and Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities. 9
Because we study the value of intangible assets to lenders, we want to take into account the amount of tangible assets borrowers have. We therefore control for firms' Tangibility, which is the total value of property, plant and equipment, divided by total assets. To control for credit risk of the borrowing firms, we use their long-term S&P credit rating. We divide firms into seven groups based on their credit ratings and include fixed effects for each group in the regressions. 10
In addition to these firm-specific variables, we also include a set of loan characteristics that are known to affect loan spread. Specifically, we include loan maturity, a dummy variable indicating loans with a performance pricing clause, and a dummy variable indicating term loans. We also include dummies for stated loan purposes. Loan purposes include debt repayment, general corporate purposes, financing acquisitions, commercial paper backup, takeover, and working capital. A more detailed description of all the variables is provided in the Appendix. We winsorize all the firm and loan characteristics at the 1 st and 99 th percentiles. Table 1 presents summary statistics for all the variables in the loan pricing analysis. The average Patent Stock is 27.1. Because citation and generality can be computed only when a firm has at least one patent, the number of observations for these two measures is smaller than for the other variables and, as indicated, there are 9,569 observations where firms have non-zero patents. Among these observations with a non-zero number of patents, the average Citations per Patent is 15 and average Generality is 0.49. Table 1 also presents summary statistics of loan characteristics. The average 9 We did not directly include any variables based on the firm's stock price as the stock market may already incorporate the intangible assets of the firm in the stock valuation.
Summary Statistics
10 Group 1 includes firms with no rating; group 2 includes firms rated CCC+ or below; group 3 includes firms rated between B-to B; group 4 includes firms rated between BB-to BB+; group 5 includes firms rated between BBB-to BBB+; group 6 includes firms rated between A-to A+; group 7 includes firms rated AA-or higher.
all-in-drawn spread in the sample is 208 basis points and the average time to maturity is 35 months, which is consistent with the statistics reported in the literature.
Empirical Results: Do Lenders Value Innovation Ex ante?

Do Lenders Value Innovation?
We first examine whether firms with patents receive cheaper bank loans. We test this hypothesis by estimating the following model:
where High Patent is a dummy variable that equals to 1 if Patent Stock is above the median among the sample with non-zero patents. Firm refers to a set of firm characteristics including Ln(Assets), EBITDA/Assets, Z Score (or Leverage and Modified Z Score), and Tangibility. Loan denotes a set of loan characteristics including Performance Pricing Dummy, Term Loan Dummy, and Ln(Loan Maturity). Macro denotes macro variables including Credit Spread and Term Spread. λ i , φ j , ψ t denote dummy variables of loan purpose i, Fama-French industry j, and year t, respectively. We predict β 1 to be negative if patents are valuable to lenders and such value is taken into account in loan pricing. Table 2 presents the results of the estimation of model (6). Estimates in columns 1 and 2 show that β 1 is significantly negative at the 1% level. The effect of patents on loan spread is economically significant as well. For example, based on the estimated coefficient from column 1, firms with an above-median number of patents are associated with a 7.19% lower loan spread. Such an effect corresponds to 14.3 basis points from the median level of All-in-drawn Spread. Columns 3 and 4 present the estimated coefficient for the subsample of firms with non-zero patents. The estimated coefficients are weaker than those estimated in the full sample but still significant at the 5% level.
Hence, even after controlling for loan attributes and various firm variables reflecting risk, profitability, and tangibility, the load spreads are lower for innovative firms. These results are consistent with lenders valuing a firm's patents and firms with patents benefiting from the lower cost of bank loans.
The loan spread is also significantly related to various firm characteristics as has been shown in the literature (Chava et al., 2008) . For example, the loan spread is significantly lower when firms have larger Ln(Assets), higher EBITDA/Assets, lower Leverage, and higher Z Score. Loan spread is also significantly lower when firms have higher Tangibility, consistent with the notion that tangible assets can be sold in the event of default and contribute to a higher recovery of debt.
To check the robustness of the results, we reestimate model (6) using three alternative measures of patents. The first measure is the natural logarithm of patent stock. We add 1 to the value of patent stock to avoid losing observations with zero patents. The second measure is the firm's patent stock divided by total patent stock of the corresponding Fama-French 48 industries. The third one is a binary variable that equals to 1 if the firm's patent stock is above the Fama-French industry median and 0 otherwise. As is shown by results in Table 3 , β 1 remains significantly negative with each of the alternative measures of patenting. In unreported tests we also exclude industry fixed effects from model (6) when using the two industry-adjusted patent measures and the estimated coefficient β 1 remains significantly negative.
We would expect the availability of patents as collateral/tangible assets to have a greater effect on borrowing costs when the loans are not secured by other assets. We test this in model (6) by including interactions between High Patent and dummy variables indicating secured or unsecured loans. As is shown by estimates in Table 4 , the significant effect of High Patent on Ln(All-in-drawn Spread) concentrates among unsecured loans, suggesting that lenders take into account the potential collateral value of patents, especially when loans are unsecured by other assets. The value effect is also economically significant among unsecured loans. Based on the estimate in column 1, among unsecured loans, high patent firms received a 14.5% (29 basis points from median) lower loan spread compared with other firms.
What Types of Innovation are Valuable to Lenders?
To examine the determinants of patents' potential value as collateral, we look into various aspects of patents such as Citations per Patent and Generality. The number of citations has been shown to be correlated with the quality of innovations (Griliches, 1990; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg, 2001; and Trajtenberg, 1990) . Patents that can be applied to a wider range of fields would be of interest to a larger number of firms and thus be considered more valuable by lenders. The more general nature of these patents may also reduce the likelihood of "fire sales", when several firms in an industry are subject to financial troubles at the same time (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992) . Therefore, we hypothesize that the relationship between the number of patents and the loan spread will be stronger when patents are more general. To test these predictions, we estimate the following models:
Ln(All-in-drawn Spread) = α 2 + β 2 High Patent × High Citations per Patent + β 3 High Patent × Low Citations per Patent + β 4 High Citations per Patent
and Ln(All-in-drawn Spread) = α 3 + β 5 High Patent × High Generality + β 6 High Patent × Low Generality + β 7 High Generality
We predict that β 2 (β 5 ) are significantly negative and larger than β 3 (β 6 ). Results shown in Table   5 confirm our prediction, which shows that β 2 and β 5 are significantly negative while β 3 and β 6
are not. In terms of economic magnitude, the coefficient in column 2 (4) suggests that firms with above-median amount of patents are associated with a 17.3 (17.5) basis-point lower loan spread from the median when their patents are highly cited (more general). These results show that the value to lenders depends on the quality of the firm's patents, as measured by the number of citations or generality.
Does Lender Expertise in Lending to Innovative Firms Matter in Valuing
Innovation?
We have shown so far that lenders value firms' innovation in pricing loans. But lenders may differ in their ability to assess and extract value from a firms' intellectual capital. We identify lenders that are more likely to value patents in loan pricing by ranking lenders by their experience in lending to innovative firms. We construct lender experience with innovative firms based on the fraction of loans in the dollar amounts that they lend to patenting firms over the loan sample period. We measure lender experience in this way for several reasons. First, the loan fraction reflects the relative importance of innovative borrowers to the lender. Second, banks that lend more to innovative borrowers may be more familiar with innovative firms and have a better understanding of the value of an innovation. More important, lenders with a larger base of innovative borrowers might be more capable of recognizing the value of patents to other innovative firms in the event of a bankruptcy reorganization or liquidation. We therefore conjecture that experienced lenders (those that make a larger fraction of their loans to patenting borrowers), value patents more than other lenders. We test this hypothesis by estimating the following model, where lenders with High Experience are those with an above-median fraction of their loans to patenting firms:
Ln(All-in-drawn Spread) = α 4 + β 8 High Patent × High Lender Experience + β 9 High Patent × Low Lender Experience + β 10 High Lender Experience
Results are presented in Table 6 and indicate that while higher patent stock is associated with a significantly lower loan spread, this is the case only when the lenders are experienced in lending to patenting firms. Specifically, estimates in column 1 show that high patent stock is associated with an 8.82% (17.6 basis points from the median) lower loan spread when lenders are experienced but not associated with a lower loan spread when lenders are less experienced. These results are found both in the full sample and in the subsample of patenting firms, suggesting that while innovation may have potential tangible value, such value is recognized and priced only by experienced lenders. 11
Identification
Our results so far indicate that lenders take into account the value of a firm's innovative activity in the pricing of their loans. However, while we control for various firm and industry attributes in our regression analysis, it is possible that the results are driven by an unobserved firm characteristic that is correlated with both the firm's patenting activity as well as (negatively) with its riskiness.
Firm fixed effects are not suitable in our context given the persistence of firm level innovation and the manner in which we defined our innovation proxies. Moreover, it is possible that there are timevarying firm characteristics, correlated with both the firm's patenting activity as well as (negatively) with its riskiness, that are driving our results. To alleviate such endogeneity concerns, we investigate an exogenous change in patent laws that enhanced the global enforcement and the term of patent protection. A finding that patents had a stronger effect on spreads following passage of the law would support the notion that the differences in loan spreads were related to the presence of valuable patents, and not just due to some unobserved firm characteristics.
Specifically, we exploit the exogenous change in patent value caused by the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act in 1994 and identify the incremental effect on loan spread. On The Act also changed the patent term. Under the old law, the patent term was 17 years from the day the patent was issued. After the enactment, patents filed on or after June 8th, 1995, were granted for a term from the issuance date to 20 years from the date of filing. 14 Lemley (1994) finds that patentees unequivocally benefit from the new law as the average patentee received 253 additional days of protection under the new term. Hence, the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act in 1994 and the associated implementation of TRIPS increased the value of patents in two ways: first, by streamlining and providing more protection and enforcement of patent rights internationally and second, by increasing the patent term. If lenders take into account the value of 12 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm. 13 More details are available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm7_e.htm. 14 http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2701.html patents in pricing a loan, this change should be reflected in a larger effect of patents on loan pricing after the passage of the law.
To identify the increase in patent value and its effect on loan price around the enactment, we test the following difference-in-differences model:
where Post is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the loan originated after 1996 and η k is the fixed effect of firm k. Ln(P atent) t−1 is the natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of patents granted in year t-1. We use recently granted patents instead of Patent Stock in order to identify patents granted under the new law. 15 We expect patents granted in 1996 to have higher value, given their longer term and strengthened protection. We estimate this model for loans from 1994 to 1997 as well as from 1994 to 1999 and only include firms that borrowed both before and after 1995. If patents have higher value to lenders, these patents should have a greater impact on loan price and β 11 should be significantly negative.
The results in Table 7 show that β 11 is significantly negative while β 12 is not significant except in column 3, suggesting that while the average firm did not experience a significant change in loan price after 1996, firms with patents granted after 1995 received significantly cheaper loans. This is consistent with the patents becoming more valuable to lenders after 1995 because of better protection and longer terms. It also suggests that the negative association between patents and loan spread shown earlier cannot be simply attributed to unobserved effects correlated with innovative firms but is instead related to the value of patents to lenders.
Empirical Results: Do Lenders Value Innovation Ex post?
In the previous section we find that lenders take a firm's patents into account in the pricing of their bank loans. We next investigate the actions, and the efficacy of these actions, when firms 15 The finding is robust to using Patent Stock.
violate covenants and the control rights pass to lenders. As noted, existing studies find a significant reduction in capital expenditures following a firm's violation of its loan covenants. Given the value of the innovative activity, however, it is possible that lenders may act somewhat differently in the context of innovative firms and may allow the borrower to maintain the level of capital expenditures, as well as the level of R&D expenditures.
To examine lenders' actions during covenant violation, we make use of the covenant violation data provided by Nini et al. (2012) . They collect records of financial covenant violations for all U.S.
non-financial public firms from the SEC 10-Q and 10-K filings from 1996 to 2007. Their finding is that firms that violate financial covenants reduce capital expenditure and experience higher stock and operating performance subsequently, suggesting an active role in governance of creditors prior to an actual payment default. We use their data and methodology to test whether lenders take different actions for innovative firms after covenant violations as follows:
where Investment refers to CAPEX/Average Assets, R&D/Average Assets, and the sum of the two.
Violation is a new violation that is not preceded by another violation in the past four quarters.
In this and in the control variables that we employ, we follow Nini et al. for the construction of the variables. Our control variables include Operating Cash Flow/Average Assets, Leverage, Interest Expense/Average Assets, Net Worth/Assets, Current ratio, Market-to-Book, and the second and third power of these variables. We also include the level and first difference of Ln(Assets) and Tangibility, calendar quarter dummies (ψ t ), fiscal quarter dummies (θ T ), and industry dummies (φ j ). We cluster standard errors by firm and quarter following Petersen (2009) . Table 8 
Change in Investment post-Violation: Comparison between Patenting and Non-Patenting Firms
We present the regression results in Table 9 . Column 1 shows regression estimates of a 4-quarter change in capital expenditure following a covenant violation. Consistent with Chava and Roberts (2008) and Nini et al. (2012) , we find that capital expenditure is significantly reduced in the year after the newly reported violations. 16 The estimated coefficients on control variables are similar as well.
We then add a variable representing the interaction between the violation dummy and an indicator for whether the firm was a patenting firm (Patent) to examine whether lenders treat patenting and non-patenting firms differently. Results in columns 2 and 3 show that only non-patenting firms experience a significant decline in capital expenditure while patenting firms do not. This could be the result of the patents being regarded as potentially valuable assets, reducing the need for drastic cuts to capital expenditures for these firms. Lenders may also be less inclined to demand cuts in capital expenditures if they regarded the investments as profitable.
We next look into changes in R&D activities around covenant violations. We estimate model (11) with a 4-quarter change in R&D/Average Assets as the dependent variable. Results in column 4 of Table 9 show that in the full sample, there is a significant decline in R&D expenditures after a covenant violation. In columns 5 and 6, we separate the effect of a covenant violation on the change in R&D for patenting and non-patenting firms. As is shown in the table, we find that there is a significantly greater decrease in R&D for patenting firms. For example, even though both coefficients are significant in column (6), the coefficient of the interaction term with Non-Zero Patent is -0.0022 while the coefficient of the other is -0.0006. Also the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between violation dummy and Zero Patent is not significant without high-order covenant control variables (column (5)). These results, together with results from capital expenditure, suggest that when patenting firms are in violation of financial covenants, lenders tend to allow capital expenditures to be maintained, while requiring cuts in R&D expenses. These findings suggest that lenders have an incentive to encourage investment into existing innovations -while paring back on investment into future innovations. There is a possibility that lenders may be requiring an excessive cut in valuable R&D from the perspective of shareholders because, as is well known, lenders may prefer lower risk investments that enhance the likelihood of loan recovery, rather than maximizing shareholder value.
16 The estimated coefficient in Nini et al. is -0.005.
However, as we discuss subsequently, these cutbacks in R&D appear to be associated with increased shareholder value, suggesting that the R&D that is being pared back may indeed have been excessive on the margin.
Next, we analyze whether patenting and non-patenting firms are different in the changes of the total amount of investment. We estimate models (11) with a 4-quarter change in (CAP EX + R&D)/AverageAssets as the dependent variable. The estimations in columns (8) and (9) show that while both groups reduce total investment significantly after covenant violation, patenting firms reduce less than non-patenting firms.
Do Experienced Lenders Take Different Actions post-Violation?
As shown earlier, experienced lenders value innovation in loan pricing more than the other lenders. 
Because the covenant violation data provided by Nini et al. (2012) does not specify the actual loan in which firms violate covenants, we cannot directly link a violation to a specific lender. Instead, we look at all the loans that originated in the past five years prior to the violation quarter and identify the most experienced lead lender among all the lead lenders. We then define lenders as experienced or inexperienced by comparing their ranking to the regression sample median. We present the estimation results in Table 10 . The results show that the coefficient of the interaction term β 17 is not statistically significant while β 18 is significantly negative at a 5% level in column 4, suggesting that firms significantly reduce R&D after a covenant violation only when they borrow from an experienced lender. In terms of capital expenditure, neither group of lenders reduce investment significantly. But given the significantly greater cut in R&D by the experienced lenders, the cut in total investment by experienced lenders is also greater and significant.
But, as noted, it is not clear whether such R&D cuts accrue to the benefit of shareholders. To see whether experienced lenders are cutting inefficient R&D, we look at cases in which R&D is likely to be inefficient. First, we follow Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2012) to measure Innovative Efficiency of firms as follows 17 :
Innovative Efficiency t = Patents Granted t /(R&D t−2 + 0.8 × R&D t−3 + 0.6 × R&D t−4
A high value of this measure reflects that R&D investments have been efficient in generating patents.
Therefore, we use this measure to judge whether violating firms have been making R&D investments efficiently compared with other firms. We estimate model (12) Table 11 . From estimates in column 2, we find that experienced lenders cut R&D significantly while inexperienced lenders do not. In columns 3 and 4, we present estimates in the subsample where firms' R&D is below industry median. In this case, neither group of lenders cut R&D significantly. This further suggests that innovative firms reduce R&D post-violation only when they borrow from experienced lenders that are knowledgable 17 Also, see Almeida, Hsu and Li (2013) about the value of patents and are able to cut inefficient investments on innovation. Hence, there is no overall evidence that lenders are unduly aggressive in terms of cutting R&D when an innovative firm faces financial challenges.
Stock Performance After Financial Covenant Violations
Even though we find evidence that lender experience and the nature of a firm's R&D expenditures affect post-violation changes to investment and R&D expenditures for innovative firms, further study is needed to understand whether these changes actually benefit the shareholders of the borrowing firms. It is possible that the lenders take into account only the return on their loan portfolio and are not necessarily maximizing overall firm value. For this purpose, we compare the post-violation stock returns of patenting and non-patenting firms. Nini et al. (2012) show that firms that violate covenants earn positive abnormal returns in the 12 months following the violation month. We follow their method and calculate post-violation CARs for each firm. First, we estimate a 4-factor benchmark model for each stock using monthly returns from 1997 to 2008. 18 Specifically, we include the 3 factors from Fama and French (1993) and a momentum factor. Therefore, for each stock we have one set of estimated factor loadings over the sample period. Second, we identify violating firms'
SEC filing month when a new covenant violation is reported and compute a firm's CARs as the mean abnormal returns over different event windows. We estimate the significance of CARs using quarter-clustered standard errors.
We report the CAR estimates in Table 12 Next, we estimate the average CARs among patenting and non-patenting firms separately. We find that while patenting firms experience significantly positive abnormal returns in the 6 or 12
18 As in Nini et al. (2012) , we account for delisting returns for firms delisted during the sample period in the estimation. Table 12 , we find that firms borrowing from experienced lenders in the past five years exhibit significantly higher CARs than other patenting firms after violation. For example, firms with experienced lenders on average earn a 1% abnormal return in the six months following violation.
In contrast, firms with inexperienced lenders do not have significant abnormal returns over the same window. This difference suggests that patenting firms benefit when the lender is experienced: the corrective actions on R&D investment policy are associated with better performance and value for firms' shareholders after covenant violations.
Conclusion
Innovation is a critical driver of long-term economic growth but it is not clear whether capital markets can appropriately value a firm's innovative activity. Raising external capital may, however, be necessary for firms, at least for those without deep-pockets, to be able to undertake significant innovative activity. In this paper, we explore whether banks, an important source of financing for both public and non-public firms, have the ability to value a firm's innovative activity and provide loans at rates commensurate with the value of a firm's intellectual property. In addition, we investigate the response of lenders when innovative firms experience a financial set-back: do lenders require cutbacks in investment and R&D expenditures that may be destructive of intellectual property? Or are they judicious in the cut-backs that they require?
Overall, our evidence suggests that lenders, especially those that are experienced in lending to innovative firms, take into account the quality of a firm's patents in pricing loans. They are also discerning in the cuts to investment and R&D that they require in the event of a covenant violation.
Firms with significant innovative activity (as proxied by patenting activity) receive cheaper bank loans as compared to firms with low innovative activity. Lenders value high quality innovative activity and provide cheaper bank loans to firms with highly cited and/or more general patents. In particular, lenders with significant lending experience to innovative firms value innovative activity more than lenders with less experience. Ex post, when covenants are violated and control rights pass to lenders, lenders with significant experience cut R&D significantly, but these cuts appear to be concentrated in firms with a lower R&D efficiency.
Consistent with these results, the stock market reacts less negatively to technical covenant violations of innovative firms. Hence, it appears that experienced lenders induce cut-backs when the R&D seems to have been excessive, even from the perspective of the firm's shareholders. Our results highlight that, despite concerns expressed in the literature and elsewhere, there are experienced banks that are capable of financing innovative activity in public firms. We believe that this, in no small part, is feasible due to the property rights that patents confer to intellectual property. In the end, patent protection and lender expertise seems to have allowed bank loans, an important source of capital for firms, to be a viable means of financing for innovative firms.
Appendix: Variable Definitions
Main Independent Variables
• Patent Stock : is the sum of patents granted in the past five years with a 20% depreciation.
• High Patent: is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if Patent is above the median among firms with non-zero Patent Stock and 0 otherwise.
• Citations per Patent: is the sum of citations on patents granted in the past five years with a 20% depreciation, divided by the sum of patents in the past five years with a 20% depreciation.
• High Citations per Patent: is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if Citations per Patent is above the median among firms with non-zero Patent and 0 otherwise.
• Generality: Generality for patent i is 1-n j s 2 i,j where s i,j is the fraction of citations patent i receives that belong to patent class j. An average generality for all patents granted in one year is computed. Generality is computed as the average of yearly average generality in the past five years weighted by the depreciated number of patents.
• High Generality: is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if Generality is above the median among firms with non-zero Patent and 0 otherwise.
• Lender Experience: is the rank of the fraction of a lender's loan portfolio that are lent to patenting borrowers. The fraction is computed based on the loan amount.
• High Lender Experience: is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if Lender Experience is above the median in the sample.
• Innovative Efficiency: is P atentsGranted t /(R&D t−2 + 0.8 × R&D t−3 + 0.6 × R&D t−4 + 0.4 × R&D t−5 + 0.2 × R&D t−6 ).
Firm Characteristics
• Ln(Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets.
• EBITDA / Assets is equal to EBITDA divided by total assets.
• Leverage is the sum of long term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by total assets.
• Z Score is defined as 3.3×(EBIT /Assets)+1×(Sale/Assets)+1.4×(RetainedEarnings/Assets)+ 1.2 × (W orkingCapital)/Assets + 0.6 × (M arketV alueof Equity/T otalLiabilities).
• Modified Z Score is defined as 3.3×(EBIT /Assets)+1×(Sale/Assets)+1.4×(RetainedEarnings/Assets)+ 1.2 × (W orkingCapital)/Assets.
• Tangibility is the total value of property, plant and equipment, divided by total assets.
Loan Characteristics
• All-in-drawn Spread : is the all-in-drawn spread over LIBOR for the bank loan in basis points.
• Performance Pricing Dummy is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the loan uses performance pricing and 0 otherwise.
• Term Loan Dummy is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the loan is a term loan and 0 otherwise.
• Ln(Loan Maturity) is the natural logarithm of loan maturity in number of months.
• Unsecured is a binary variable that is equal to 1 if the loan is not secured by collateral and 0 otherwise.
Macro Variables
• Term Spread : is the spread between 10-year and 1-year treasury notes in basis points.
• Credit Spread : is the spread between BBA and AAA yields in basis points.
Variables in Quarterly Panel
• ∆CAPEX/Average Assets t,t+4 : is the change in CAPEX/Average Assets from quarter 0 to quarter 4.
• ∆R&D/Average Assets t,t+4 : is the change in R&D/Average Assets from quarter 0 to quarter 4.
• ∆(CAPEX+R&D)/Average Assets t,t+4 : is the change in (CAPEX+R&D)/Average Assets from quarter 0 to quarter 4.
• Operating Cash Flow / Average Assets: is the operating income before depreciation divided by average of current and lagged total assets.
• Interest Expense / Average Assets: is the interest and related expense divided by average of current and lagged total assets.
• Net Worth / Assets: is the shareholders' equity divided by total assets.
• Current Ratio: is total current assets divided by total assets.
• Market-to-Book : is the market value of equity plus total liability minus deferred taxes and investment tax credit, divided by total assets. In this table we analyze whether lenders value innovation. We present estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is Ln(All-in-drawn Spread) and the independent variables of interest are High Patent. The following firm and loan characteristics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), EBITDA/Assets, Z Score (or Leverage and Modified Z Score), Tangibility, Performance Pricing Dummy, Term Loan Dummy, and Ln(Loan Maturity). Credit Spread and Term Spread, Year, industry, credit rating and loan purpose dummies are also included. t-statistics using robust, firmclustered standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Full Sample Patent Sample
High Patent -0.0719*** -0.0666*** -0.0520** -0.0475** (-3.36) (-3.27 In this table, we use alternative patent measures as independent variables. In column 1 and 2, we use natural logarithm of patent stock. We add 1 to the value of patent stock to avoid losing observations with zero patent. In column 3 and 4, we use patent share which is the firm's patent stock divided by total patent stock of the corresponding Fama-French 48 industry.
In column 5 and 6, we use a binary variable that equal to 1 if the firm's patent stock is above the Fama-French industry median and 0 otherwise. The following firm and loan characteristics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), EBITDA/Assets, Z Score (or Leverage and Modified Z Score), Tangibility, Performance Pricing Dummy, Term Loan Dummy, and Ln(Loan Maturity). Credit Spread and Term Spread, Year, industry, credit rating and loan purpose dummies are also included.
tstatistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Ln(Patent Stock)
Patent Share
Above Industry Median (All-in-drawn Spread) and the independent variables of interest are High Patent and its interaction with dummy variables of Citation per Patent or Generality. The following firm and loan characteristics are also included in the regressions:
Ln(Assets), EBITDA/Assets, Z Score (or Leverage and Modified Z Score), Tangibility, Performance Pricing Dummy, Term Loan Dummy, and Ln(Loan Maturity). Credit Spread and Term Spread, Year, industry, credit rating and loan purpose dummies are also included.
t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
(1) and the independent variables of interest are High Patent and its interaction with dummy variables of Lender Experience. We measure lender experience by ranking the fraction of loan amount that is lent to patenting firms over the sample period. The following firm and loan characteristics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), EBITDA/Assets, Z Score (or Leverage and Modified Z Score), Tangibility, Performance Pricing Dummy, Term Loan Dummy, and Ln(Loan Maturity). Credit Spread and Term Spread, Year, industry, credit rating and loan purpose dummies are also included. t-statistics using robust, firm-clustered standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Full Sample
Patent Sample In this table, we present estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is Ln(All-in-drawn Spread) and the independent variables of interest is the interaction between Patent Granted in Year t-1 and Post. The following firm and loan characteristics are also included in the regressions: Ln(Assets), EBITDA/Assets, Z Score (or Leverage and Modified Z Score), Tangibility, Performance Pricing Dummy, Term Loan Dummy, and Ln(Loan Maturity). Credit Spread and Term Spread, Year, firm, credit rating and loan purpose dummies are also included. t-statistics using robust, firmclustered standard errors are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. Year 1994 -1997 Year 1994 -1999 (1) In this table, we present estimates from regressions where the dependent variable is ∆CAPEX/Average Assetst,t+4 in column (1) to (3), ∆R&D/Average Assetst,t+4 in column (4) to (6) and ∆(CAPEX+R&D)/Average Assetst,t+4 in column (7) to (9) and the independent variables of interest are Violation and its interaction with Zero Patent or Non-Zero Patent. The following covenant variables are also included in the regressions: Operating Cash Flow / Average Assets, Leverage, Interest Expense / Average Assets, Net Worth / Assets, Current ratio, Market-to-Book. The second and third power of these covenant variables are also included in column (3), (6) and (9). We also control for firm characteristics including level and first difference of Ln(Assets) and Tangibility. Calender quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies and industry dummies are also included in all specifications. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
∆CAPEX/Average Assetst,t+4
∆R&D/Average Assetst,t+4
∆(CAPEX+R&D)/Average Assetst,t+4
(1)
(8) In this table, we present estimates from regressions among patenting firms where the dependent variable is ∆CAPEX/Average Assetst,t+4 in column (1) and (2), ∆R&D/Average Assetst,t+4 in column (3) and (4) and ∆(CAPEX+R&D)/Average Assetst,t+4 in column (5) and (6) and the independent variables of interest are
Violation and its interaction with Low Lender Experience or High Lender Experience. We measure lender experience by ranking the fraction of loan amount lent to patenting firms over the sample period. The following covenant variables are also included in the regressions: Operating Cash Flow / Average Assets, Leverage, Interest Expense / Average Assets, Net Worth / Assets, Current ratio, Market-to-Book. The second and third power of these covenant variables are also included in column (2), (4) and (6). We also control for firm characteristics including level and first difference of Ln(Assets) and Tangibility. Calender quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies and industry dummies are also included in all specifications. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
∆CAPEX/Average Assets t,t+4
∆R&D/Average Assets t,t+4
∆(CAPEX+R&D)/Average Assets t,t+4
(1) We measure lender experience by ranking the fraction of loan amount lent to patenting firms over the sample period.
The following covenant variables are also included in the regressions: Operating Cash Flow / Average Assets, Leverage, Interest Expense / Average Assets, Net Worth / Assets, Current ratio, Market-to-Book. The second and third power of these covenant variables are also included in column (2) and (4). We also control for firm characteristics including level and first difference of Ln(Assets) and Tangibility. Calender quarter dummies, fiscal quarter dummies and industry dummies are also included in all specifications. t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and calendar quarter are in brackets. *, ** and *** indicate significance better than 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. We compute monthly excess returns (CAR) by estimating the four-factor return model including the three factors from Fama and French's (1993) 
